RYDER v. MANSELL.

ances of certain land, the Statute of Frauds was ]told a complete defence: while under Jack v. 1 Jkfce, as Judge WOtIDWARD Slggested in his dissenting opinion illMalaun v. Ammon, the plaintiff
could in an action for the breach of the contract have recovered the
whole value of the land. In Whitehead v. Carr, 5 Watts 368, the
remark of Judge TILGHMAN in Ewving v. Tees, sulra,as to the small
amount of the damages to be recovered in an action for the breach
of a parol contract, &c., was cited. In 1ahins'v. O'Conner, 10
Watts 320, ROGERS, J., said " If a parol contract for the conveyance of land has been violated the party has his remedy by action
when he will recover the damages which he has actually sustained."
In Hastings v. Eekley, 8 Penna. St. 197, it had been held that the
damages for the breach of a parol contract to convey land in consideration of services were the value of the services and not that
of the land.
Hertzog v. Hertzog was followed in Graham v. Grahan, 34
Penna. St. 482, which spoke of Jack v. MfcKee as an evasion of
the law ; in 2J1cNair v. Compton, 35 Penna. St. 28, Judge WOODWARD adding, that as against a fraudulent vendor greater damages
would be given (see supra); in Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Penna.
St. 383, and in Harris v. Harris, 70 Id. 174. As to cases of
contract to reward services by the conveyance of land, see Browne
on Stat. of Frauds, § 271. In Poorman v. Kilgore, 37 Penna.
St. 311, it was said that .ffertiog v. Hertzog, etc., correcting a mis*taken rule as to damages, did not affect the right to sue on the parol
contract. See Burr v. Todd, 41 Penna. St. 212, a case not under
the Statute of Frauds, but one of the measure of damages for the
breach of a penal bond, as supporting Hertzog v. Hertzog, on the
general principles of the law of damages, apart from the statute.HENRY REED.
(To be continued.)
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ISXIAII L. RYDER v. WILLIAM If.MANSELL.
Thc principle of estoppel which prevents a tenant from denying his landlord's
title, applies to the relation that exists between the hirer and letter of a house,
standing upon the land of a third person, as personal estate.
A tenant is not estopped to deny his landlord's title after that title, under which

his own tenancy began, has ended and the estate has become vested in the tenant
himself.

RYDER v. MANSELL.
A foreclnure by a mortgagee, descrihing himself as William Mansell, may be
mualid, altholgh hi.; whole nameluw
is William H. Mansell, lie being known to be the
anme person hy either name, and it being evident that no misapprehension or mistake was caused on that account. *

Ox report. Forcible entry and detainer and assumpsit; two
actions tried together and made law on report of the same evidence.
The premises, the possession and the rent of which the plaintiff
sought to recover, was a house built on land leased of the Highland
Slate Company.
The plaintiff, a mortgagor in poisession, about November 1st
1873, let, in writing, the house to the defendant, at a rent of three
dollars per month for six months. After certain sundry monthly
payments of rent, the evidence introduced against the plaintiff's
objection, tended to show that the defendant purchased of the mortgagee his interest and notified the plaintiff of his intention to foreclose. The plaintiff assented thereto, stating, as the evidence tended
to show, that he would rather submit to the foreclosure than continue to pay twelve per cent. on the mortgage-note of $100, the
rate agreed. with the probable understanding, as the colnsel argued,
that he would have three years to redeem, and could collect rent all
the while. The defendant foreclosed in sixty days, as for personal
property, serving the notice on the plaintiff's grantor, and not upon
the plaintiff, and stating his own name in the notice as William ff.
Mansell, anti not as William Mansell, the name in the deed. The
certificate of the justice showed that William Mansell made oath to
the certificate of William .H. Mansell. The foreclosure, if the proceedings were valid, expired 'March 3d 1874.
IV. P. Young, for the plaintiff.-The defendant having entered
into possession under a lease from the plaintiff, and having neither
been evicted by paramount title, nor surrendered possession, is
estopped to deny his landlord's title, and therefore any testimony to
show title in the defendant is inadmissible: Longfellow v. Longfellow, 54 Maine 240; Same v. Same, 61 Id. 590. The relation
of landlord and tenant existed between the lessor and the lessee of
the house standing on land of a third party by permission: Smith
v. Grant, 56 Maine 255; R. S., c. 94, § 2, last sentence. By this
foreclosure the defendant, under the forms of law, undertook a fraud
upon the plaintiff, and should be held to follow strictly and technically
the fornis. There is no evidence that William Mansell and William
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H. Mans-1l are the same person. Iri any event the plaintiff is
entitled to L,Vo months' rent ending with the foreclosure.
. A. -Everett,for the defendant.-The house built upon the land
of a third party, was personal property : Osgood v. Howard, 6 Maine
452; Bussell v. Richards, 10 Id. 429; Hilborne v. Brownt, 12
Id. 162; Davis v. Emerj, 61 Id. 140. In such case the relation
of landlord and tenant does not apply. If the relation does apply,
still the tenant can show that the landlord's title has been put an
end to: 1 Hill. Mort. 183. Other points taken by counsel appear
in the opinion.
PETERS, J.-The facts material to this controversy are these:
The plaintiff was the owner of a house, situated on the land of a
third person, upon which house was an outstanding mortgage. The
plaintiff let the house to the defendant by parol agreement, for a
rent to be paid monthly. After this, the defendant purchased the
mortgage upon his own account, and foreclosed it as one upon personal property. Before the foreclosure was commenced, the defendant notified the plaintiff of his purchase, but never surrendered
the possession of the house to him, nor offered to.
The suit is for rent which accrued both before and after the foreclosure was perfected, and the complaint for possession was instituted after it was perfected.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant is liable for rent of the
house until he shall surrender possession of the same to him, and
that, until that is done, he is estopped, by the relation of landlord
and tenant, to set up any claim of title of his own thereto. On the
other hand, the defendant contends that he cannot be ousted from
the possession by the plaintiff, and that he is not liable for any rent
accruing subsequently to his purchase of the mortgage, whether
foreclosed or not.
Our opinion is, that the plaintiff can recover for the rent of the
house, up to the time when the defendant's title thereto became
absolute and completed by foreclosure, and that he cannot recover
for any rent after that time; and that the complaint for forcible
detainer cannot be maintained.
The defendant contends that the doctrine of estoppel, such as
exists by the relation of landlord and tenant, does not apply to a
building that is merely personal property. We think it does apply
to a house which is personal estate, situated as this house appears
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to be. Although, perhaps, not distinctly disclosed by the evidence,
it is inferable that the rightful possessor of the building would be
entitled to the free use of the soil. By hiring the house, the defendant became entitled to use and enjoy the possession of the land
upon which the house stands. The reason of the rule of estoppel
appJlics to this property with as much force as to any other. Many
landlords have themsel'es only the estate of lessees. And the doctrine of estoppel as between principal and agent, and bailor and
bailee, is not widely different from that which applies between hirers
and letters of real estate: Coburn v. Palmer, 8 Cush. 124; Hilbourn v. Fogg, 99 Mass. 11; Smith v. GCrant, 56 Maine 255. As to
bailments, see collection of cases in Abbott's U. S. Dig., vol. 2, 476.
But the defendant was not bound to the plaintiff as his landlord
after the mortgage was finally foreclosed. Although a tenant, without a surrender or eviction, or something equivalent thereto, cannot
show that the title of his landlord was not a valid one when he
entered under him, he can show that such valid title has been legally
extinguished or determined, so that it no longer exists. He does
nothing thereby inconsistent with the lessor's right to grant the
original lease. The tenant cannot be allowed to plead to his landlord's action nil habuit in tenementi, but he can plead nil habet, &c.
A tenant does not deny that the landlord had a title at the beginning
of the lease, by showing that the same title has expired. This
exception to the general rule is well established by numerous authorities, and is entirely consistent with the reasons for maintaining the
rule itself. We do not perceive why the facts of this case do not
bring these parties within the application of this principle. See
cases cited supra. Also cases collected in note under title of
-stoppel, in Chitty on Plead., 16 Am. ed.; Wash. on Real Prop.,
vol. 1, book 1, c. 10, § 8. Lamson v. Olarkson, 118 Mass. 348,
O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Id. 28, and Whitney v. Dinsmore, 6 Cush.
124, are cases directly in point.
The plaintiff makes a point that the mortgage is not well foreclosed, because the defendant in the papers is sometimes described
as William 1. Mansell, and sometimes as William Mansell, with the
middle initial omitted. But we are satisfied that by both names lie
was known to be the same person, and that no misapprehension or
mistake has occurred on that account: Collins v. Douglass, 1 Gray
VOL. XXV.-75
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167; Hubbard v. Smith, 4 Id. 72; State v. Tagyart, 38 Maine
298 ; Dutton v. Simmons, 65 Id. 583, 585.
The result is that, in the complaint of forcible entry and detainer
the complainant is nonsuit; and in the action at law the defendant

is to be defaulted.
APPLETON, C. J., WALTON, DICKERSON, BARROWS and VIRGIN,
JJ., concurred.
The maxim that "a tenant cannot
dispute his landlord's title," like all
other general maxims, is liable to be perverted and misunderstood. At the ancient common law a tenant was not estopped to deny his landlord's title, unless the lease was under seal. See Davis
v. Tyi1r, 18 Johns. 490. Nay more,
he was not estopped even by the acceptance of a-lease under seal. It must have
been an indenture under seal, signed by
the tenant as well as by the landlord.
A lease, or deed-poll, signed only by
the landlord, and the enjoyment of the
estate under it would not, by the old
law, prevent the tenant from denying
the lessor's title, either in an action for
the rent, or to an avowry in replevin
for goods taken by the landlord as a
distress for rent: Co. Litt. 47 b
Palbnerv. Ekens, 2 Ld. Raym. 1550.
When the lease was by mutual indenture the tenant could not set up the plea
of nil habuit in tenenentis, not because
forbidden by any general rule of law,
but merely because by his own deed
under seal, he had conclusively admitted the lessor's title. It was the effect
of the seal, not of the lease, nor of the
relation of landlord and tenant.
Still more: although the lease was
by a mut-ial indenture under seal, the
tenant was .not estopped, except in
actions of which the demise was the
gist, as covenant for the rent, or in
defence of a replevin suit by the tenant
for the goods distrained for rent, the
avowry by the landlord. The estoppel
did not arise in an action of debt for the
rent, for that was not founded upon the

indenture : see Sgflirau v. Shadling, 2
Wils. 208 (1764) ; Chettle v. lPound, I

Ld. Raym. 746.
It was for that reason that even if a
tenant held under a lease by indenture,
he was not estopped from denying his
lessor's title, except during the term
stated in the lease ; for by the lease the
estoppel was created, and by the end of
the lease it was determined : Co. Litt.
47 b. After the termination of his lease
therefore, if he still continued to occupy
he could set up a pre-existing title in
himself, even against his old landlord.
See Page v. Kenisinan, 43 N. II. 328
(1861).
But in modern times the doctrine of
estoppel has been very much extended.
It is now recognised independent of the
form or nature of the lease, whether
sealed or unsealed, written or oral. It
is at present based on perinissive possession irrespective of the demise or any
limits drawn from it. It is an estoppel
in pais and not by deed.
The landlord puts the tenant in possession ; the tenant takes possession
from the landlord ; these facts, taken
together constitute an estoppel in the
tenant to deny his landlord's title.
WILDE, B., in Duke v. Aslby, 7 H. &N.
600. It is a kind of equitable estoppel,
and may be shown by the evidence,
without being technically pleaded -as
such. (The present sort of estoppel
was not known in Lord Coke's day.
By an estoppel in pais he meant a very
different thing.)
And notwithstanding some intimations to the contrary, there is some
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ground to believe that under this modern
view the estoppel. endures so long as the
permissive possession continues, whether
the original term of hiring had or had
not expired ; and that a tenant who
holds over after the expiration of his
original term, is as much estopped as
before to deny his landlord's original
title, and is as much liable for rent to
him as before, until he surrenders possession to him, or attorns, or at least
gives his landlord distinct notice that
he shall claim under, another and a
valid title. And this has been thought
to result, from the principle that it is a
tenant's duty at the end of th6 term to
surrender possession to the landlord,
and until he discharges that duty, or is
legally excused from it, he shall not be
permitted to claim title in himself. See
Miller v. Lang, 99 Mass. 13 ; Jackson
•&iles, I Cow. 575 ; Hawes v. Shaw,
100 Mass. 189 ; Jackson v. Harper, 5
Wend. 247 : and many other cases.
But while he is still estopped by the
modern rule so long as his permissive
possession continues, to deny his lessor's original title, he is not thereby estopped, as held in the principal case, to
prove that it has expired since the pogsession commenced, either by its own
"limitation, or by the act of the lessor,
and eviction b/paramount title. This
is not denying his landlord's title, but
is admitting it and proving that it no
longer exists. See England v: Slade,
4 Term 682 -" Doe v. Edwards, 5 B. &
Ad. 1065 ; Jackson v..Davis, 5 Cow.
124 ; Den v. Ashnore, 2 Zab. 261.
The court were unquestionably correct
in the principal case in extending the
principles of estoppel, -wbibh are now
acknowledged in leases of real estate, to
a hiring of personal property, as the
building in this 'case was. There can
be no difference in the principle of the
thing in either case. Ever since the
case of Shelbury v. Scotsford, Yelv. 23

(1602), a hirer of personal property has
been allowed to show in defence of an
action therefor by the letter that the
property really belonged to a third person, who had asserted his title thereto.
It is setting up the jus tertil, as it is
termed. There is in such cases an implied undertaking on the part of the
bailor that the property really belongs
to him, ana that he has a right to let it,
and the undertaking of the hirer is to
return it to him, if he is lawfully entitled to it, and otherwise not. See Cheesman v. Exall, 6 Exch. 341 (1851).
But it is held in such cases that
to entitle the bailed to this defence, the
true owner must have asserted his title
by what is equivalent to an eviction by
a title paramount, and that is not
enough merely to show that such out
standing right existed: Biddle v. Bond,
6 B. & S. 225 (1865) ; Mallace v.
Matthews, 39 Geo. 617 (1869) : Bates
v. Stanton, 1 Duer 79 (1852) ; BJdlerv.
Kenner, 14 Martin 274 (1824).
And asserting his claim and forbidding the bailee to deliver the property
to the bailor has been held.sufficient;,
Thorne v. Tilbury, 3 H. & N. 534
(1858) ; Sheridany. The New Quay Co.,
4 C. B. N. S. 617 (1858). Especially
if the. bailee has delivered up the goods
upon such demand: King v. Richards,
6 Whart. 418 (1841), one of the best
cases on this subject. But if the real
owner chooses to abandon his claim, or
not to assert it, the bailee cannot take
advantage of it to defeat his bailor's re-.
covery: Bedteley v. Read, 4 Q. B. 511.
The principle as to denying the plaintiff's original title therefore being analogous in actions concerning real and
personal property, there seems to be no
reason why it should not also be extended, as was done in this case, to allow
the hirer to show that the lessor's original title had expired since the letting.
EDMUND IL BExCNETT.
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Supreme Court of NAew York. Special Term, MarcA 1877.'
FRANCIS KINNEY v. JULIA BASCI

Er AL..

While the rule is well settled that geographical words and numerical characters
of a descriptive nature cannot be appropriated as trade-marks, courts of equity

will restrain the use of such words and characters where they are adopted and
employed for purposes of deceit.
symbol " ,"
Plaintiff used the designation "1St. James," and the numerical
'
to distinguish his cigarettes. Defendants used the words " St. James Parish
Perique Cigarettes" and the symbol I II," applying the latter in the exact form
employed by plaintiff. Although it was shown that the term ,St. James Parish
Perique" was one in common use and that the symbol " " was used by both
plaintiff and defendants only on mixed cigarettes, an injunction restraining the use
of both designations was granted.
THis was a bill to restrain the infringement of certain trademarks.
The plaintiff was a well-known manufacturer of cigarettes and
used a label embracing (1) a representation of a field of divergent
rays; (2) the words "St. James," and (3)the symbol " ," besides
other features which were not subjects of controversy. The words
" St. James" were conspicuously displayed in the plaintiff's label,
and it was shown that his cigarettes were distinguished in the market
by that name. Concerning the symbol "J," it was shown that
plaintiff was the first to use it and that it assisted in the identification of his goods.
The defendants, who were manufacturers of little note, employed
a label of the same size as plaintiff's, differing from it slightly in
color. It bore the words "St. James Parish Perique Cigarettes,"
the words "St. James" being conspicuously displayed, and "Parish
Perique Cigarettes," in some degree obscured by ornamentation.
The symbol "1" was an exact copy of that used by the plaintiff.
In other respects the labels were substantially unlike. Defendants
showed that there was a St. James parish in Louisiana; that St.
James Parish Perique tobacco was a common article of commerce,
and that plaintiff's cigarettes, as well as their own, were actually
made of this kind of tobacco. Concerning the symbol " ," it was
proved that it had been used only on mixed goods, and that both
plaintiff's and defendants' goods were mixed. Sundry persons
testified that this was the meaning attached by the trade to the
symbol.
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Rowland Cox and Charles Meyer, for plaintiff.
GkristopherFine, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
YAN BRUNT, J.-This action is brought to restrain an alleged
infringement or imitation of certain trade-marks of the plaintiff,
which he has attached to certain cigarettes manufactured by him.
The defendants claim that the labels which they attached to the
cigarettes manufactured by them are not such imitations of the
plaintiff's labels as would mislead the public, and that even if they
were, no elements of property could ever be acquired in those words
and symbols which the plaintiff claims were his trade-marks.
A careful inspection of the labels in question shows beyond a
doubt that those of the defendants were adopted in order to deceive
the public into supposing when they purchased the cigarettes of
the defendants' manufacture that they were those of the plaintiff's
manufacture.
As far as the use of the sun's rays are concerned, it seems to me
the plaintiff has established beyond any reasonable doubt that he
first adopted the device in connection with his manufacture of
tobacco. The evidence to-the contrary upon the part of the defence
is of the most meagre and unsatisfactory character. The plaintiff
has entirely failed to show any. right to the exclusive use of the
word "corporal," it being clearly shown that that word has been
used in connection with manufactured tobacco for many years prior
to its appropriation by the plaintiff.
The only remaining question to be considered is the right of the
plaintiff to the exclusive use of the words "St. James," and the
figures " " upon his labels.
It has been urged upon the part of the defendants that geographical names cannot be the subject of a trade-mark; neither can
numerals, which only serye to indicate the nature, kind, or quality
of an article..
It is true that the cases cited by the defendants sustain these
propositions; but the later cases have proceeded upon different and
more equitable principles in defining the grounds upon which courts
of equity interfere in cases of this description.
This interference, instead of being founded upon the theory of
protection to the owners of trade-marks, is now supported mainly
to prevent frauds upon the public. If the use of any words, nume-
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rals or symbols is adopted for the purpose of defrauding the public
the courts will interfere to protect the piiblic from such fraudulent
intent, even though the person asking the intervention of the court
may not have the exclusive right to the use of these words, numerals or symbols. This doctrine is fully supported by the latest
English cases of Lee v. Haley, Law Rep. 5 Oh. App. Cases 155;
and Jfotherspoon v. Currie, Law Rep. 5 House of Lords, English
and Irish Appeals 508; and, also, in the case of Newman v.
Alvord, 51 N. Y. 189.
It is claimed by the defence that the use of the numerals " "
by the plaintiff is intended to represent that these cigarettes are
made one-half of Perique and one-half of Turkish tobacco. Although
the fact may be that the cigarettes may be thus composed, yet the
numerals used do not by any means indicate this fact. They may
as well relate to price, to size, to quality, to numbers, as to the
quality of tobacco, and, consequently, cannot be descriptive of any
particular quality except as they have been so used in connection
with the plaintiff's label.
It seems to me, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to protection in the use of these numerals in connection with his cigarettes:
Gillot v. Bsterbrook, 47 Barb. 455.
It being apparent that the use of the words "St. James," by the
defendants is intended to defraud the public into the belief that
when they buy cigarettes with those words upon the labels, they
were buying cigarettes of the plaintiff's manufacture, the court will
necessarily interfere for the protection of the public.
It is urged that the defendants' labels are no imitations of the
plaintiff's. I am led irresistibly to the conclusion that the adoption
of the label by the defendonts was solely because they thought the
public might be deceived; and the differences were made in the
hope that they might avoid possibly the damages arising from the
use of a perfect imitation.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to an
injunction, restraining the defendants from the use of the device of
the "1sun's rays" upon their cigarettes, and also, from the use of
the numerals "1j" and the use of the words " St. James" in connection therewith.
The view announced in this opinion
is advanced, but may be safely said to
be settled law.
Courts of equity are not misled by

plausible excuses. The worst fraud is
that which bears on its face the semblance of conscience. If the facts show
that the respondent is using the truth
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as a cloak for fraud, equity will pursue it is sought to sustain a descriptive
and check him the same as if the fraud word and one where it is sought to
was apparent on the surface of the case. enjoin the use of a technically descripThe principle above stated is sus- tive word which is a simulation of one
tained by the most authoritative cased, that is not descriptive. In the former
and will, probably, not be contro- case plaintiff has no right to stand
upon ; in the latter his right to his
verted.
From it the courts have deduced a mark is conceded, and the question is
corollary, which has come to be a re- simply how far the court will go in
cognised rule in the law of trade-marks, protecting him.
But whatever the cases touching
that may be stated as follows :If the facts show that the respondent words of a descriptive nature decide,
they are not to be construed to conflict
is using an imitation of complainants'
trade-mark, it is no defence that the sim- with those cited by the court in the
There is not, it is
ulated mark is technically descriptive. principal case.
This proposition of law is not less thought, more than the semblance of
certainly established than the broad confusion. The fair deduction from
principle from which it flows. In its the two classes is this :
Words of a descriptive nature are
application distinctions of the nicest
character arise, but they present only publici juris; but where a descriptive
the difficulties that are incidental to word is used by a person as a means of
every investigation where the fraud effecting a fraud, an injunction will
complained of is not so clumsy that it issue: especially jf it appears that the
descriptive word was selected by reason of
it is axiomatically plain.
The rule that descriptive words can- its being similar to a word in use by annot be directly or indirectly monopo- other, ratherthan on account of its being
lized, is not open to doubt. But it appropriateand well understood.
This is, in effect, the rule stated by
has never been so distorted as to enable
a party to make it available in the *de- Judge FANCHER,in the case of Lea v.
Wolff, 1 Am. Law T. Rep., N. S. 400,
fence of a fraud. On the contrary it
has been found, as matter of fact, in wherein he says: "Geographical words
all the cases, that the descriptive char- cannot be appropriated as trade-marks ;
acter of the word or words was indis- but the rule has its exception where the
putable. In nearly every instance the intention in the adoptionof the descriptive
word or words had been applied by the word is not so much to indicate the place of
plaintiff in such a manner that they manafactureas to intrench uon the predescribed his goods. It is believed that vious use and popularity of another's
there is not a case in the books where trade-mark."
The tendency of courts of equity is
a descriptive word has been used by a
defendant to simulate an arbitrary word to advance the principle quite as far as
used by a plaintiff in which an injunc- it has been carried by the accomplished
tion has been refused. There is a mani- author of the opinion in the principal
"
ROWLAND COX.
fest difference between a case in which case.
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Supreme Court of Nichigan.
THE KIMBALL AND AUSTIN M1ANUFACTURING CO. v. SETH
YROMAN,

SURVIVOR OF HIMSELF AND

LEWIS YROM1AN.

Where a declaration was brought against a company by naming its president
for the time being as defendant on its behalf, which would have been proper if it
had been a joint-stock company unincorporated, and organized under a particular
statute, it was held right to allow an amendment striking out his name and thus
leaving the case to stand against the company by name as a corporation, service
on the president having been proper under any of the statutes, and the object of
the declaration being to enforce a company liability.
A party cannot by admitting a fact prevent his adversary from producing documentary evidence on the subject.
Declarations of the agents of a manufacturing company concerning the quality
and condition of an engine made during negotiations for the sale, and during
experiments to amend defects, may be received as res gestc.
Evidence of willingness to buy an article at second-hand is not inconsistent
with reliance on representations that it was serviceable and perfect.
Where there is full proof of the actual condition of an engine, evidence of what
damage it might possibly have suffered under supposable circumstances is theoretical and improper.
When it is one of the terms o. a contract that an engine is good, and if not
found so on trial shall be made good, the right to return it, in case of failure, is
in pursuance and not in avoidance of the contract, and a count for breach of
warranty is not inconsistent with one averring return, or with the common count
for money had and received.
The person injured by breach of warranty of such a nature as would justify a
return, cannot be compelled to elect between a return and damages, but may be
entitled to both. The purchase price may not make good all his losses, and the
retention of property which is unfit for use may be onerous and ruinous.
A manufacturer who sells an engine not made by himself, with warranty that it
is in good condition and if not found so shall be placed in such condition, puts
himself in a position analogous to that of one who contracts to build and furnish
one; and an acceptance by the purchaser is conditional, and does not bind him to
keep it unless answering the warranty.
It is commendable for a court to cover the ground by a continuous and intelligible charge; and the multiplication of separate points and requests, which the
jury can only hear once, and must act upon from a single oral exposition, is apt
to lead to confusion and uncertainty, and is not to be favored.

Yt AN and his deceased co-plaintiffs below sued plaintiffs in
error to recover for a cause of action arising out of an alleged breach
of warranty of a steam-engine, purchased of the latter, and found
so defective as, according to the claim, to be practically useless:
Judgment was recovered below for the original purchase-money
with interest, and error was brought for various causes, including
an amendment in the name of the plaintiff in error, and certain
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rulings on the questions of warranty and damages, as well as on
evidence, and on the form of the issues.
Severeus, Bondeman & Turner, for plaintiffs in error.
May & Mason, for defendants in error.
The oIpinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-The pleadings as first put in described as defendant "William A. Tomlinson, as president for the time being of the
Kimball and Austin Manufacturing Company, a company organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of said state, and doing
business at Kalamazoo in the county aforesaid."
On the trial an amendment was allowed whereby Tomlinson s
name and official character were stricken out, and the suit was left
to stand as against the company by name; this was excepted to, as
creating a change of parties.
The statute of amendments allows the correction of "any mistake
in the name of any party or person :" C. L., § 6051, subd. 9. In
the case of Final v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218, a mistake in a writ
was corrected in the name of the original plaintiff from Baxter to
Backus, after defendant had entered default for want of declaration,
and the declaration had been filed in the correct name of Backus;
the default was opened and after issue joined the cause was tried on
the merits, and on error the amendment was sustained. In Parks
v. Barkham, 1 Mich. 95, an amendment was held good which
changed the defendant's name from James Barkham in the writ and
affidavit for replevin to Joseph Barkham, the process having been
served on the right person but under a wrong name.
The statute was not intended to allow changes in the parties
actually supposed and intended to be brought before the court.
It is only in case of an undesigned misnomer, and where the
interests of substantial justice will allow it, without a real change
in the identity of the opposing litigants, that such amendments
should be permitted. Where, however, no substantial rights are
affected, and it is clear what persons were meant to be reached, the
law permiti the record to be rectified by affixing the true name to
the misnamed party.
In the present case the suit was originally brought as it would
have been proper to bring it against a joint stock association for
VOL. XXV.-76
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manufacturing purposes, organized under the law of 1846, found in
chapter 37 of the compiled laws of 1871, entitled "An Act to
regulate private associations and partnerships." By section 10 of
that statute, all actions against the company were required to be
brought against the president for the time being, or some trustee, as
nominal defendant; and it was provided that judgments, though in
form against such officers, should take effect and operate against the
company.
Such companies were not technically corporations, which could
not, in 1846, be created under general laws, but they resembled
these as closely as was possible, and were very different from any
ordinary private partnerships.
The declaration originally filed in this case was not drawn in
such a way as to indicate the claim to be a personal claim against
Mr. Tomlinson, so as to make the description personal and not
official. It is so drawn as to show a purpose of enforcing a liability against an association, the name of which was the Kimball
& Austin Manufacturing Company, as the real defendant, represented for the single purpose of suit by Mr. Tomlinson, its president for the time being. The suit was, in legal contemplation, a
suit against the association.
The mistake, then, was not in the name or identity of the
defendant pursued, but only in regard to the statute under which
it was organized as a corporation, instead of an association closely
resembling a corporation. The case shows that Tomlinson was
president of the corporation, and that service was properly made
on him as such. The form of his defence was representative and
not personal, and under the statute service made on him is good
where the corporation is regularly sued.
In Sherman v. Ihe Proyrietorsof the ConnecticutBiver Bridge,
11" Mass. 338, the suit was originally brought against "The
proprietors of a bridge over Connecticut river, between Montague
and Greenfield, late in the county of Hampshire, and now in the
county of Franklin." Such a corporation had once existed for the
purpose of building a bridge, but never built it, and their charter
expired. Subsequently, another and distinct corporation, called
"The Proprietors of Connecticut River Bridge," was created, who
built the bridge concerning which the action arose. The writ
was served on the clerk of this latter company, but the suit was in
form against the former, which had ceased to exist. There was no
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legal identity or succession between the two corporations. Nevertheless an amendment was permitted, whereby the name of the
existing body was substituted for that of the expired corporation.
The process having been served on the new company, it was held
a common case of misnomer which justified the correction.
That case resembles this in its legal features, and goes beyond it
in permitting a change where the record did not show any identity
of names in the parties sought to be pursued. In the present case
the company named as defendant in its corporate capacity was
named in a statutory character of association as real defendant in
the first place, and only sued by a representative instead of personally. No one could be ignorant of the real object of the suit, and
the service was made precisely as it would have been had no mistake been made.
It seems to us that the case is fairly within the equity as well as
language of the statute, and the amendment was rightly allowed.
The questions of evidence on which errors are alleged, relate
to proof of incorporation and to the admissions or declarations of
various persons, which are claimed to have been no more than
hearsay, as well as to the exclusion of some testimony offered.
The defendant's counsel, having admitted its incorporation,
objected to the production of the articles of incorporation. This
testimony was properly received, as it would be absurd to hold
that any party, by his bald admissions on a trial, could'shut out
legal evidence: Hancock futual Life Insurance Conpany v.
Moore, 34 Mich. 41. One very proper reason for desiring to
introduce the document, was to show the names of the corporators,
some of whom acted in the bargain on which suit was brought.
In addition to evidence concerning the terms of the ziegotiation
and the statements and representations attending it, the testimony
showed that immediately after the first trial of the engine, the purchasers complained of the failure to defendant, and its manager
sent out a man named Charles Barrett to fix it. Evidence was
given, under objection, of Barrett's statements concerning the condition, of The engine while working at it and trying it. The objection urged in this court is, that some of these statements were not
made to plaintiffs, but to strangers. In the court below no such
ground was pointed out, and the objection was that the statements
were hearsay, and not within the scope of Barrett's authority.
As Barrett was sent down for the purpose of rectifying any
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existing defect, and ascertaining, for the benefit of all parties, what
ailed the engine, we can see no reason why all that he is sworn to
have said should not be regarded as a part of the transaction which
he was sent to carry out. The persons who reported the declarations seem to have been jointly engaged in the trial of the machine.
There was also evidence tending to show farther that plaintiffs were
personally present at the experiments.
William R. Gibson, defendant's foreman, was shown to have
taken some part in the conversations which preceded the purchase
of the engine in controversy, which was a second-hand engine and
purchased as such. Gibson, when introduced by defendant as a
witness, was asked by defendant's counsel whether anything was
said about selling plaintiffs a new engine and what it was. The
purpose of this offer, as expressed, was to show that plaintiffs declined to purchase a new engine and wanted a -second-hand one.
The court rejected the question.
There certainly would have been no error in receiving this testimony, which related to a part of the negotiations, all of which were
admissible; and inasmuch as other witnesses for the same party
who took a more active part in the business, were allowed to show
the same facts, it is difficult to understand why it was excluded,
unless, possibly, because Gibson did not have anything important
to do with making the bargain.
But we do not see how the exclusion of it damaged any one.
The case showed by the testimony on both sides that plaintiffs
understood they were buying a second-hand .engine made by some
one else than the sellers, who were makers of engines and of course
in the habit of selling their own work. Willingness to buy a secondhand engine has no tendency to disprove evidence showing that it
was represented as serviceable and perfect. If an engine is fit for
use at all, it is fit for continued use, and there can be no presumption or probability that a good engine, well used, will be seriously
impaired very soon. It is only claimed that there was harm done
by the exclusion of this testimony, because it would have tended to
contradict the testimony that this engine was represented and believed to be substantially as serviceable as a new one. The wit-nesses were all heard concerning what was actually represented.
We do not see how the expressed preference of'plaintiffs for a secondhand engine could prove any more than their deliberate purchase
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of one, or could in any way tend to show that they did not want a
good one.
The court also excluded the following question put to Mr. Gibson,
"What damage would the engine have likely have been exposed to
in the hands of an incompetent engineer ?"
It was claimed by defendant that the damage to the engine, which
consisted in defects in the boiler and flues, and not in the machinery,
was all caused by bad usage at the hands of the plaintiffs and their
men, and that when they received the property it was in good order.
Gibson had testified very fully concerning the actual condition
of the engine, and in what manner and by what misuse or neglect
such injuries would be caused. All evidence offered to account for
the state of things shown to exist was admitted, whether of eye-witnesses or of experts; and Gibson had explained his views fully on
these matters. The damage which the engine had, in fact, suffered
was fully shown by eye-witnesses. The causes of that damage were
as thoroughly explained by skilled witnesses. The engine was in
existence and Gibson had seen it before and after its sale. Such a
question as the court rejected was therefore entirely speculative and
irrelevant. What might have happened was unimportant when the
testimony showed plainly what had happened; and whether such
things showed incompetency or carelessness, was properly discussed
by the witnesses in the light of the facts themselves.
The principal questions in the case are more or less connected
with the nature of the representations alleged to have been made
by defendant, and plaintiff's rights under them.
The declaration contains two special counts, one alleging that
the defendants warranted the engine to be in good condition and in
good running order, and that it would do good work, and that if
it would not do good work, defendant would put it in condition to
do so for the purposes for which plaintiffs required it. It avers
that defendants deceived and defrauded plaintiffs in that the engine
was not in good condition or in good running order, or suitable for
the required purpose, and defendants, though requested, did not
put in such condition, &c. ; but the engine was old, the flues worn
out and leaky, and the engine in bad condition and unfit for the
required use, and became useless and of no value to plaintiffs, and
they have been put to great charges and expenses, &c.
The second count was more specific, setting out the required
purpose to be for running a threshing-machine, and detailing the
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various promises and breaches, with allegations that plaintiffs informed defendants of their own ignorance on the subject, and of
their reliance on defendant.
There was also an averment in each count of the payment of the
whole purchase-money, partly in cash and partly in a note paid at
maturity. The declaration also averred at the conclusion of the
second count, the return and tender of the engine to defendant, and
refusal to receive it or restore the consideration. The common
counts were also added.
There was testimony on the part of the plaintiffs which, if believed, made out a complete cause of action. This was contradicted
on the part of the defence. The testimony on both sides showed
that the chief defects were in the fire-box, boiler, and flues, producing a leakage of steam to such an extent as to destroy the
effectiveness of the engine, and make it substantially useliss to the
purchaser. The unfitness was, if existing, not merely unfitness
for a threshing-machine, but unfitness for any useful work requiring the aid of such motive power. Upon the questions of fact, if
properly submitted, the finding establishes the deficiency of the
engine when sold, and the warranty made and broken.
But one prominent point in controversy arises concerning what
is claimed to be an inconsistency in the plaintiff's claim. This is
said to spring from the assertion under one part of the declaration
of a right to damages under a contract, while on another theory
the contract is claimed to be repudiated for cause, and suit brought.
to recover back the consideration.
As the contract is fully set forth, the question whether upon w
breach of warranty a right existed to return the property is one of
law, and, as there was no acceptance of the return, if that right
did not exist, then the averment of return offered was surplusage
and left the special counts as if it had been omitted, and the claim
of too much would not vitiate the rest; if, on the other hand, it
should be held that on a breach of warranty the right to return existed, the question arises whether such return is in pursuance of the
contract or in repudiation.
Where a party gives no warranty, but is guilty of such fraud as
vitiates the contract, it is clear enough that the effect of the fraud
is to authorize its entire repudiation. The grievance is that -the
agreement as it turns out is not the agreement which the party
supposed he was making. But where a warranty is given the
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legal effect is usually, if not universally, to make the stipulation
stand as security for performance, and the injured party prosecutes
his remedy upon it to enforce and not to avoid the agreement.
While a right to return property which does not answer the assurance is not always or generally expressed or implied in the
warranty, yet if agreed upon it is in no way inconsistent with a
warranty. It is a very common thing to make warranties in that
precise way, and to give the right of return in case of breach.
Courts have undoubtedly multiplied dicta to the effect that such a
return was a rescission of the sale. But we think there is no warrant for saying that any action under a contract can be properly
called action in avoidance of it. If the language is correct in any
sense, it can only mean that so much of the contract is rescinded
as fixed the title in the purchaser, But if the contract itself provided for a return of goods and did not at the same time provide
that on such return the parties should be placed in statu quo, with
no claim for further redress, any doctrine that holds the warranty
discharged, holds that parties cannot make such agreements as they
see fit to make for lawful purposes.
The very object of stipulating for a return of property is frequently to relieve the purchaser from the burden of retaining or
caring for something which unless suitable to his needs, will be an
annoyance or injury to him, which he would not voluntarily accept
for any price. It may easily-happen that the .expense and trouble
to which a purchaser is put by reason of the failure of his purchase
to meet his expectations, will exceed the purchase price so much as
to render its reimbursement an insufficient compensation, while
the obligation to retain the article would be still more burdensome.
There is no justice in such a case in compelling him to relinquish
his actual damages as a condition of getting rid of an obnoxious and
useless chattel. If a purchaser of tainted meat, or of a dangerous
animal, which he cannot sell on any terms without doing harm to
his neighbors, must keep it, or forego all claims for damages beyond
the price, his'case is a very hard one. We can see no reason in
such a doctrne, and we do not find any such clear authority in its
favor as to -indicate that it belongs to the law. The cases which
seem to favor such a rule do not, we think, really establish it. The
dicta have mostly been thrown out on an entirely different issue
not raised here, namely, whether upon certain classes of contracts
there is an implied warranty where none is expressed. There are
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some, no doubt, where the right to recover the price paid, without
a return of the property, has been considered and denied, but this
does not dispose of the real question whether the return and recovery are in affirmance or in avoidance of the contract, and whether
the recovery is confined to the price paid as money received for the
purchaser's use, and without consideration moving to him.
The cases cited on the argument throw very little light upon this.
But the case of Poulton v. Lattimore, 9 B. & 0. 259, which has
been fully approved, holds that there may be cases where a purchaser
without returning an article may yet be allowed its cost. There, in
a suit for the price of seed, it was shown in defence that the seed
was warranted as good new growing seed. Defendant had planted
part and sold the rest to others who planted it, and it all proved
unproductive. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and it
was held correct, and that the breach of warranty was admissible in
defence without a cross action. In Grimoldby' v. Wells, Law Rep.
10 C. P. 391, it was held that notice of refusal to keep was all the
return required, and the vendor must take away his own property.
In Head v. Tattersall, Law Rep. 7 Exch. 7, a party who had
bought a horse under a warranty that he had hunted with the
Bicester hounds, with a right to return the horse if not answering
the description up to the next Wednesday evening, returned him
before Wednesday, but after the horse had, without plaintiff's fault,
been seriously damaged by an accident. The declaration was in the
exact form of the one before us, containing one count for breach of
warranty, one for such a breach, with an allegation of return of
the horse, and a count for money received to the plaintiff's use.
No one questioned the correctness of the declaration or claimed a
misjoinder of causes of action, but issue was joined on all the
counts, both generally and by special defences, and a recovery was
had for the price paid. A rule for a new trial was sought on the
grounds that the horse was not, and could not be returned in the
same condition as when sold, and that plaintiff was only entitled
on the evidence to nominal damages and not to the price paid" but
a new trial was refused.
Although no question was raised on the declaration, that of
itself is of some significance, where the case shows much attention
was paid to questions of pleading, and the nature of the controversy rendered it improbable that any defect would be overlooked.
The case of Heilbutt v. Hickson, Law Rep. 7 C. P. 438, is a recent
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and valuable case, showing the real character of these transactions.
There the defendants agreed to sell plaintiffs thirty thousand army
shoes according to a sample shown them, to be inspected and
approved before shipment, and payment made on delivery. Shoes
were inspected, approved, and delivered at the appointed wharf in
London, and paid for. They were forwarded by plaintiff to Lille,
to meet a contract he had made with the French government.
After a considerable number had been delivered and sent forward,
it was heard that contractors had been punished in France for
furnishing army shoes having paper fillings in the soles. Whether
any shoe had these could only be determined by cutting it open,
which had, not been done in any case by plaintiff's inspectol
in England. Upon some discussion arising upon the subject,
defendants wrote a letter to plaintiff, agreeing to take back such
shoes as were thrown back on his hands by the French authorities
as containing paper, provided it was found in any large proportion.
The French authorities rqjected the whole invoices, and left them
in warehouse at Lille, and plaintiff notified defendants he would
have nothihg more to do with them. He also did the same as to
further parcels which had been delivered and paid for in London,
but not shipped. The court held the inspection and acceptance in
London did not cut off the remedy for the unknown defect not
discoverable by that kind of inspection. It allowed a recovery not
merely for the price but for dimages, including forwarding freight
and insurance, and loss of profits which would have been received
of the French government on 'the whole contract, including both
such shoes as had been delivered and such as had not been delivered.
This decision is just, and is entirely inconsistent with the idea
that a return of the goods is an ending of the contract. The
remedy given could only be justified as the enforcement of an
existing agreement, and the decision recognises this as its f6undation. The statement of the case is that it was an action for
breach of contract, and the pleadings were 'omitted on the expressed
ground that they were immaterial, as the main contention was concerning the tmeasure of damages
We are of opinion that the action properly lies for a breach of
contract, in case of return as well as in other cases, unless the
whole contract is sought to be avoided. In this view there is no
inconsistency in the joinder of counts, and the only further contro
versy, where a case is made out of breach of warranty, -would be
VoL. XXV.-77
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concerning the measure of damages. In those cases where there
is no right to a return, the damages may be, and perhaps generally
will be, different from what could be proper where the property is
returned. And in cases of return, it is also manifest that there
may be differing rules applicable to different states of fact.
Complaint is also made of the character of the instructions
touching what would amount to a warranty. It is claimed that the
effect of the instructions, and of the omission to give a number of
separate requests, was to confound the distinction beween representations and warranties.
That distinction is well established, and if the charge was open
to this criticism it was erroneous. Taking isolated passages, it
would seem so; but on a full comparison of the various instructions given, we think otherwise. The object of every charge is to
present the questions to the jury in such a way as to lay before
them the correct rules for their guidance in such a manner that
they will be likely to comprehend them. Where, as in such cases
as this, representations may become warranties or not according to
the understanding of the parties actual or presumed, or- according
to their known or supposed relative positions as to knowledge or
ignorance, or the facilities of examination or other facts whichmight qualify them, the method and order of expounding the rules
must be left very much to the discretion of the circuit judge. Ap
pellate courts cannot lay down rules of rhetoric or logic in such.
cases, and can only inquir6 whether erroneods doctrine has -been;
propounded. It may be that the most logical way of presenting
qualifications is to state the rule with all its conditions in a single.
sentence. But it is not likely a jury or any other ordinary listener,
not trained in the law, would catch at once and comprehend and
remember, -from a single oral statement, or from a series of separate theories, a rule thus briefly qualified. Experience has shown
that to many, if not to most persons, the qualifications themselves
often need explanation and comparison, and unless fully and carefully handled, are apt to escape notice. And it is not allowable to
select particular assertions or rulings, and treat them as isolated
and independent propositions, when they.are only parts of a chain
of propositions which, when completed, is a full and true exposition
of the law. The multiplication of specific requests, however correct in law, is much more likely to befog a jury than to enlighten
them; and it is commcndablo rather than erronous for a judge, so
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long as he covers all the ground, to combine such instructions as
are pertinent, as far as he can, in one connected charge, instead of
attempting to lay down a number of alternatives, in answer to
questions. In such a controversy as that before us, if there is anything to be criticised, it is the tendency of the requests to run into
abstract principles rather than to the specific necessities of the
issues of fact, which were very narrow, and in no wise complicated
except by conflicting evidence.
As we understand"the bill of exceptions, there were two substantial main issues-one whether the engine in question was warranted,
and the other.whether the injuries to it occurred before or after the
sale. . The verdict of the jury upon the second question is not impugned for any error in the charges. The warranty is therefore
the principal matter before us.

IThe court charged on this head, in substance, that on such sales'
there ws no implied warranty ; that representations did not amount
to warranties unless so intenda, and so understood by both parties;
that a warranty must be accepted by the purehaser as well as offered
by the seller, tnd that, in determining the mutual understanding,
the situation and the conduct-of the parties -at the. time and afterwardq was oien to conslderatio, aad that warranties might be made*
at any stage of the negotiations for sale before the conclusion bf the
purchase. Siic- -iW"thinlk is 'the understanding fairly to be deduced -fromthe charges given.
We can see no error in these propositiolis against the. rights of'
the -seller of the engine. The only point which would apparentlyralso a doubt, is:ohi the effect-of the subsequent conduct of the par-ties. But the testiihony to whichh
-this referred, was as to their;
riafltuul course-when.complaint Was first made of the faihfre of the'
engine. The conduct of the agents of-the compAny in regard to;
further repairs and trials was certainly very pertinent in showing
how they looked on the facts, and -amounted, if the jury believedthe testimony for-plaintiff below, to a practical admission of liability.
Thete -was nothing to indicate any improper application of the rulings, and none was pointed out on the" argument.
We think also, that the court sufficiently called the attention of
the jury to the difference between a warranty of general quality
and fitness for work, and one of fitness for a specific purpose. In
directing the jury that in the former case the purchaser was not'
entitled to return the engine unless the representations were fraudulent, the charge went beyond the rights of the defendant below.
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The warranty alleged, and which was supported by evidence
-which the jury must have found true, was not merely that the engine was then in good condition, but that if not, then it should be
made so. This involved a future trial of the engine and future
work upon it if needed, and to this extent placed it on the same
footing as if they had been contractors to furnish an engine of
their own building, which the purchaser would clearly have a right
to return if not such as he had bargained for. Under such a. contract the acceptance is necessarily conditional, and does not bind
the purchaser to keep what is not made to answer the agreement.
On this there seems to be no doubt in the authorities.
Upon the rule of damages very little discussion is needed. If
there was any warranty at all, it was one which, if broken justified
a return of the property. This being so, and the purchase price
having been shown, the plaintiff was entitled to recover that at all
events. The only charges complained of on this head related to a
rule of damages applicable where no return was allowable or offered.
The case called for-no such rulings. The jury have found no more
than the purchase-money and interest, and their finding cannot be
impugned as the case stands. The errors were, if they existed at
all, prejudicial to the defendant in error rather than to the plaintiffs in error.
We deem it proper to suggest, as has been done before on several
occasions, that the multiplication of points and requests, in cases
where the issues are not complicated, is of injurious tendency and
calculated to confuse both courts and juries and impede the administration of justice. The jury must act in their deliberations on
the understanding which they derive from a single hearing of the
charges and requests. Unless made plain to their understanding
and expressed in such language as requires no interpretation to the
laity, there is much danger that they will either be misled or disregard the instructions altogether and decide the case on what they
conceive to be its general equities. There is no occasion on this
record to imagine there was anything objectionable in presenting
to the court the various propositions set out; but we cannot but
think that specific charges on all of them would have served no
good purpose. We have discovered no failure to instruct the jury
upon any essential features of the case, and it was not, we think,
erroneous to abstain from doing more than was done.
We find no error, and the judgment must be affirmed with costs.

WILLIAMS BROS. v. TRIPP.

Supreme Court of 1hode Island.
WILLIAMS BROTHERS v. TRIPP, CITY TREASURER.
A statute being in force providing that "all highways * * * lying and being
within the bounds of any town, shall be kept in repair and amended, from time to
time, so that the same may be safe and convenient for travellers with their teams,
carts, and.carriages, at all seasons of the year, at the proper charge and expense
of such town, under the care and direction of the surveyor of highways for such
town." * * *"C Such town shall also be liable to all persons who may in anywise suffer injury to their persons or property by reason of any such neglect ; to
be recovered in an action on the case, to be brought against the town or towns
which are bound to keep said road or bridges in repair as aforesaid." The citk
of Providence, under authority given it by the legislature of the state, built by
contract a sewer in Washington street, a highway in said city. The street was
obstructed and rendered impassable during and by the construction of this sewer.
W., a grocer doing business on the obstructed part of the street, sued the city for
loss of profits and increased expense and trouble in the conduct of his business
caused by the obstructions in the highway, claiming that the work of construction
had been unduly and unnecessarily prolonged. At the trial the court instructed
the jury that if the work was done with reasonable care and diligence, taking no
more time than was necessary, the plaintiffs, though seriously injured, could not
recover at all; but that, if there was unreasonable dela. in doing the work, and,
during this delay, access to the plaintiffs' store was cut off or obstructed, in- the
manner described, it was an injury to the plaintiffs for which the plaintiffs would
be entitled to recover : recovering damages, however, only for the prolongation
of the obstruction beyond what was reasonably necessary. Redd, that there was
no error in the instruction.
Held, further, that the injury complained of was not one common to the plaintiff and the rest of the public.
Redd, further, that the act of the legislature, authorizing the construction of the
sewer, impliedly remitted the duty of keeping the highway where' the sewer was
building, " safe and convenient," but that this implied remission was only for
such time as was reasonably necessary for the work.
Hdd,further, that the.city, by a contract for its own benefit, cannot relax the
obligation of a duty imposed on it by statute for the public benefit.
The doctrine that a municipality cannot be held liable for the consequences of
an act which it is legally authorized or is required to perform, will not justify an
invasion of private property even if the invasion is only consequential.

DEFENDANTS'

petition for a new trial.

.Dexter B,. Potter, for plaintiffs.
.iohola

Van 8lyek, City Solicitor, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFEE, C. J.-The first count in the declaration alleges that
tihe city of Providence "-wrongfully neglected and refused to keep;
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and to keep in repair, a certain public highway in said city, commonly called and- known as 'Washington street,' so that the same
was safe and convenient for travellers, their teams, carts, carriages,
and on foot, as by law it was bound to do; but, on the contrary,
'suffered and permitted said highway to be and remain out of repair,
and unsafe and inconvenient for travellers, with their teams and
-carriages, and for foot-passengers: to wit, said city made, and suffered to be made, deep cuts and excavations in, and along, said
highway, and threw, and suffered to be thrown upon said highway,
and the sidewalks to said highway, and in front of the place of
-business of the plaintiffs, large quantities of dirt, stone, and gravel,
and suffered and permitted the same to be and remain. in said high:way, and upon the sidewalks, for a long space of time, to wit, from
-October 1st 1872, to May 12th 1878, by means whereof the said
-plaintiffs, while travelling on and using the said highway, and while
carrying on their usual and ordinary business, viz., that of keeping
a grocery store, were greatly injured and damnified thereby, and
thereby lost their usual trade, and the profit that would otherwise
-have accrued unto them, by carrying on their business, as aforesaid,
'and were also thereby put to great trouble and expense in moving
merchandise, and in delivering goods, and were also put to great
trouble and expense in extra labor," &c. The second and only
other count is similar to the first.
. The testimony produced at the trial in support of the declaration
showed that, in 1872-1878, the plaintiffs kept a grocery on Washington street, and that in October 1872, the street was excavated
for a sewer, and the dirt thrown from the excavation upon the sides
of the street, and over the sidewalk in front of the plaintiff's store,
and for considerable distances'above and below their store, thus
rendering the street impassable for teams, and inconvenient for
pedestrians, and putting the plaintiffs to additional trouble and
expense in receiving and delivering goods, and deterring, for awhile,
a portion of their habitual .eidstomers from resorting to the store for
trade. The plaintiffs also submitted testimony to show that, after
the street was put in this conditiow, it was suffered to remain so for
two or three weeks, while little.or, nothing was doing towards the
construction "of the sewer; that then -the work was resumed, and
went on for about fifty days before it was completed, but that the
dirt and stones-were not entirely cleaned away until some time in
April 1878. They claimed indemnity for their loss of trade, and
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for the increase of expense and trouble, incurred by them during
the unnecessary prolongation of the work. For the city, testimony
was introduced to show that the sewer, though constructed under
the authority given to the city, was not constructed by, but for the
city, under contract with it, and that the contractors, not the city,
had control of the men employed on the work, the city having
power only to supervise the work, and to take it from the contractor
and complete it itself, in case the contractor should fail to fulfil the
terms of the contract, first giving the contractor three days' notice
in writing of its intention to do so. Testimony was also introduced
to show that the city took pains to ascertain that the contractor
was a proper person to contract with for the work, and that, after
it learned that the work was not progressing with reasonable dispatch, it gave the contractor the. three days' notice, stipulated for
in the contract, and thereupon put the sewer into the hands of
another contractor, who pushed it forward to completion with proper
expedition.
It was contended, on the part of the city, that if the city had
used reasonable care and diligence in making the contract, and in
taking the work out of the hands of the contractor when he failed
to perform it with due dispatch, the city was not liable to the plaintiffs in this action for any delay or negligence on the part of the
contractor or his employees. It was also contended that the injury
sustained by the plaintiffs was an injury which they sustained in
common with the rest of the public, and was not so special and
peculiar in its character that it would entitle them to maintain their
action against the city. These points were presented in various
requests for instruction, which, however, we do not -deem it necessary more particularly to recite. The court instructed the jury
that, if the work was done with reasonable care and diligence, taking
no more-time than was necessary, the plaintiffs, though seriously
injured, could not recover at all; but that, if there was unreasonable
delay in doing the work, and, during this delay, access to the
plaintiff's store was cut off or obstructed, in the manner described,
it was an injury to the plaintiffs for which the plaintiffs would be
entitled to recover: recovering damages, however, only for the
prolongation of the obstruction beyond what was reasonably necessary. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for $200. The
case is now before us, upon the defendants' petition for a new trial,
for alleged errors in the instructions to the jury.
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Two questions are raised by the petition: 1st, Was the injury
resulting to the plaintiffs froiia the obstruction so special and peculiar
that an action on the case will lie in their favor for the damage ?
2d, if so, will the action lie against the city of Providence, notwithstanding the contract under which the work creating the obstruction
was done?
1. We do not think the injury was one which the plaintiffs suffered in common with the rest of the public. It was peculiar to
themselves. The public generally suffered no such loss of trade,
and was put to no such trouble and expense in receiving and delivering goods as the plaintiffs suffered and incurred in consequence
of the obstruction in front of their place of business. Wilkes v.
Hungerford 3Market Co., 2 Bing. N. 0. 281, is a leading case upon
this subject. There the plaintiff, a bookseller, having his shop on a
public thoroughfare, suffered a loss of trade or custom, in consequence of an unauthorized obstruction across it. The court decided
that the injury was peculiar to the plaintiff, and that he was therefore entitled to recover. See, also, Stetson,' v. .Faxon, 19 Pick.
147, where the cases upon this point, occurring previous to 1837,
are fully collected and reviewed: Blanc v. Klumpke, 29 Cal. 156.
The obstruction here was not remote, but abutted directly on the
estate of the plaintiffs: Willard v. City of Cambridge, 3 Allen
574.
There is a matter connected with this point which was not discussed at the bar, but which deserves a passing remark. In Maine,
Reed v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 20 Me. 246; Sandford et ux. v.
Inhabitants of Augusta, 32 Id. 536; Weeks v. Inhabitants of
Shirley, 33 Id. 271 ; in New Hampshire, Ball v. Town of Winchester, 32 N. H. 435; Griffin v. Sanborntony 44 Id. 246; in
Massachusetts, Smith v. Inhabitants of Dedham, 8 Cush. 522;
Holman v. Inhabitants of Townsend, 13 Met. 297; Brailey et al.
v. Inhabitants of Southborough, 6 Cush. 141; Harwood v. City
of Lowell, 4 Id. 810; and in Connecticut, Chidsey v. Town of
Canton, 17 Conn. 475, it has been held that towns, under their
statutes, are liable only for injuries to person and property suffered
by persons using the highway, and not for damages sustained in
consequence of not being able to use it, nor in consequence of not
being able to use it without additional trouble and expense.
Some of the cases cited were decided in view of the specific terms
used in the statutes, and some of them in view of the fact that

WILLIAMS BROS. v. TRIPP.

language, originally specific, had been generalized in revision for
the sake of brevity merely, as was supposed, and not to extend its
meaning: Barwood v. City of Lowell, 4 Cush. 310. Our statute
makes the towns "liable to all persons who may in any wise suffer
injury to their persons or property by reason of any such neglect."
The provision appears first in the Digest of 1844. It has always
remained -the same. Its meaning cannot be narrowed by tracing
it to an earlier form. It is certainly broad enough, giving proper
effect to the words "in any wise," to cover a consequential injury
to property, and, therefore, broad enough, we think, to cover the
injury complained of by the plaintiffs.
2. A statute of the state makes it the duty of the several towns
and cities of the state to keep their respective highways "safe and
convenient" for travellers with their teams, carts, and carriages, at
all seasons of the year, and provides that any town or city which
shall neglect this duty "shall be liable to all persons who may in
any wise suffer injury to their persons or property by reason of any
such neglect." The duty being imposed by statute cannot be qualified by anything of less authority. A town or city which is subject to the duty cannot qualify it by contract or otherwise. But
by statute it can be qualified, and qualified, too, either expressly or
by implication. A statute confers upon the city of Providence the
power to make sewers in the streets of the city. This power cannot be exercised without a remission of the duty, and, therefore,
by implication, the duty is suspended, while a sewer is making, for
so long a time as is reasonably necessary to do the work. But
beyond that the implication does. not go, and, therefore, if more
time is taken, it is taken in violation of the statutory duty, and any
person who is specially injured thereby, either in his person or his
property, is entitled to indemnity under the statute. This would
hardly be disputed if the city had made the sewer for itself. The
contention is that the city did not incur liability, because, instead
of making the sewer for itself, it let it out to be made by a contractor. In support of this many cases have been cited. The
cases cited are, however, distinguishable from the case at bar. They
were decided on the principle that, when a person has work done
for him under contract, without reserving to himself any direct control of the contractor or his men, there is no relation of principal
and agent, or of master and servant, between him and them, and,
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consequently, no such liability for their torts and n6gligences as ii
incident to that relation. The cases would have value as precedents
if, for instance, the city were sued for some tort or negligence of
the contractor or his men, not amounting to a public nuisance. The
city, if so sued, could not, according to those cases, be held, if it
had parted, and could lawfully part, with the control of the work.
That, however, is not this case. Here, the city is sued for neglecting its statutory duty. It says in excuse that the duty was suspended for the time being by the making of a sewer in the street,
under an authority conferred on the city by statute. The answer
is, that the work on the sewer was unreasonably prolonged. The
city replies that it is not to blame for that, because the making of
the sewer was committed to a contractor. Then comes the question whether the city can, by making a contract for its own benefit,
relax the obligation of a duty imposed upon it by statute, for the
benefit of the public. We think it cannot. The city has both the
duty to perform and the power to exercise, and, if it exercises the
power, it is bound to exercise it so as not unnecessarily to circumscribe or suspend the duty. It may make the sewer itself, or it
may commit the making to contractors; but if it elects to commit
the making to contractors, it must still see to it that the streets are
not unnecessarily obstructed; for, in whichever way the work is
done, the duty to keep thestreets safe and convenient is the same:
Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; City of Cincinnativ. Stone

et al., 5 Ohio St. 38 ; Brooks et ux. v. Inhabitants of Somerville,
106 Mass. 271, 276; Inhabitants of Lowell v. Boston & Lowell
Railroad Corp., 23 Pick. 24, cited and commented on in .Hilliard
v. Rihardson, 3 Gray 349, 352-3; Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall.
566, 575 ; Gray et ux. v. Pullen & Hubble, 5 B. & S. 970 ; Hole
v. Sittingbourne & Sheerness RailroadCo., 6 H. &N. 488; Lesher
v. Wabash N'avigation Co., 14 Ill. 85; Chicago, St. Paul& Pond
du Lao Railroad Co. v. MfeCarthy, 20 Ill. 385.
We find it unnecessary, in the view which we have taken, to
consider a question which has been somewhat -discussed, namely,
whether the city did not reserve to itself such a control of the contractor and his men as to make it liable, even as principal or master,
for their torts and negligences. We express no opinion upon that
question, but, for the reasons already stated, refuse a new trial.
Petition dismissed.
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supreme Court of New Jersey.
GEORGE W. BROWN v. CYRENIUS HENDRICKSON.
In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, this court has power to order one
judgment to be set off against another, where the judgment prayed to be set off
may be enforced against the person recovering the judgment to be satisfied by the
set-off. The doctrine is a purely equitable one, and will be administered in all
cases upon such equitable terms as will promote substantial justice.
By virtue of the control which courts have over their suitors and over the officer
who executes their process, the set-off may be ordered, although the judgments are
not in the same court.
The bona fide holder by assignment of a judgment against two defendants, is
entitled to have a judgment recovered against him by one of such defendants, after
such assignment, set off against the assigned judgment, even though the second
judgment is assigned to a third person, for value, without notice of the assignment
of the first judgment to the defendant in.the second judgment. The assignee of
the second judgment takes it subject- to all existing equities, of which the right to
set off is one.
The cost of the second judgment will not be included in the order to set off; the
attorney's liens for cost will ba preserved.

. APPLICATIoN on the part of defendant to have judgment recovered
against him by plaintiff set-off against a judgment against plaintiff,
held by defendant by assignment. On the 6th of November 1875,
Herbert & Thompson recovered, in this court, a judgment against
Cyrenius. Hendrickson and Henry D. Hendrickson, for the sum of
$1788.58, which, on the 28th of April 1876, was assigned to the
above-named defendant, George W. Brown. In November 18,76,
the said Cyrenius 'Hendrickson recovered, in this court, a judgment
against the said Brown, for $653.22, which was, immediately thereafter, assigned to Asher Holmes "and others.' The assignment to
Holmes was drawn and signed by Cyrenius after the verdict was

rendered, and before judgment was actually entered; but it was, in
terms, an assignment bf the verdict and judgment to be entered,
and could .not take effect, fully, until the judgment was entered,

and must, therefore, be regarded as an assignment of the judgment.
Application was now nade iiy Brown' to have the judgment reco-

vered against him set off against the judgment which he held by
assignment;*.

F.K-ingman, for-the plaintiff.
Ukilion Bobbins, for the defendant.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN SYCKLE:, J.-It has long been the established practice in
the English courts to afford this relief in proper cases. In Mitchell
v. Oldfiehl, 4 T. R. 12.3, where A. had a judgment against C., and
C. recovered a judgment against A. and B., C. was permitted, on
motion, to set off the damages which he had recovered against those
obtained by A.
Lord Ku oN-, in that case, said that this rule did not depend
on the statute of set-off, but on the general jurisdiction of the court
over the suitors in it ; that it was an equitable part of their jurisdiction, and had been frequently exercised.
The court permitted the defendants, in Glaisterv. Hewer et al.,
8 T. R1. 69, to set off a judgment recovered by them against the
plaintiff, against a judgment obtained by the plaintiff against
them, notwithstanding the plaintiff may also have had a separate
demand on one of the defendants.
So far was the practice carried in Alliance Bank v. Holford,
16 C. B. (N. S.) 460, that A., having obtained a verdict against
B. & Co., bankers, for the amount of his cash balance, and B. &
Co. having brought actions against A., upon bills of exchange to a
larger amount, the judge stayed the execution in A.'s action, until
the following term. B. & Co.'s actions, in the meantime, ripened
into judgments, and then the court allowed the judgments to be set
off against each other.
In Doe v. -Darnton,3 East 149, the application was denied,
because the interest of third persons intervened, who had peculiar
trusts by statute.
The uniformity with which this rule has been accepted by the
courts in England, will be shown by reference to the following,
among many other cases of like effect: Baker's Adm' r v. Brahan,
2 W. BIl. 869; Hall v. Ody, 2 B. & P. 28; Bourne v. Benett, 4
Bing. 423 ; Sehoole v. Noble, 1 H. Bl. 23 ; O'Connorv. M1furphy,
Id. 657.
The same rule prevails in New York: Cooper v. Bigalow, 1
Cowen 206 ; 1M1iller v. Gilman, 7 Id. 469; Kimball v. Al1unger,
2 Ilill 364; Graves v. W~oodbury, 4 Id. 559 ; Sinison v. Hart,
14 Johns. 63.
In the case last cited, SPENCER, J., said, "That although the
demands, being joint and several, are not, strictly speaking, due in
the same right, yet, if the legal or equitable liability or claims of
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many become vested in, or may be urged against one, they may
be set off against separate demands, and vice versa."
In 1?eeve8 v. Hatklnson, 2 Penn. 751, this court properly
refused to allow an assigned judgment to be set off in an action of
assumpsit before judgment in such action, by pleading it under the
statute concerning set-off, on the ground that it was not a debt for
which the assignee could maintain an action in his own name.
But this case does not conflict with the practice of setting off one
judgment against another, so as to narrow the execution to the
balance due, a practice subsequently adopted by this court in Coxe
v. State Bank, 3 Halst. 172.
The fact that the judgment was assigned to Brown does not defeat
the application of the rule: Miller v. Gilman, 7 Cowen 469;
Cooper v. Bigalow, 1 Id. 206.
In testing the right to a set-off, it is not necessary that the judgment should be in the same right: it is enough if the judgment
prayed to be set off may be enforced at law, against the party recovering the judgment to be satisfied by the set-off: provided it is not
in a representative capacity: Simson v. Hart,14 Johns. 63 ; Turner v. ,Satterlee, 8 Cowen 480.
Although, where one of the parties in the cross actions has
a signed his interest to a third party, there may be no right to set
off the judgment, yet where the assignee, being the real plaintiff in
one action, is also the real defendant in the other, there is such
right of set-off: Standeven v. lurgatroyd,27 L. J. Exch. 425;
4 Fisher's Dig., tit. Set-off, p. 7771.
Courts of law proceed, in directing the set off of judgments, upon
the equity of the statute authorizing set-offs, for it is confessedly
not within the letter of the act. The power is derived from the
control which they exercise over their own suitors, and over the
process, the aid of which those suitors invoke.
By virtue of this control over their suitor, and the sheriff who
executed their process,- the Supreme Court of New York ordered'
their judgnient to be set off against one in the Common Pleas "
Kimball v. Munger, 2 Hill 864.
The doctrine is a purely equitable one, and will be administered
in all cases upon such equitable terms as will promote substantialjustice. These applications being founded on no positive statute, or
any fixed rule which compels the court to grant them, are addressed
to the discretion of the court, and, in the exercise of that discretion,
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even where the set-off might legally be made, if the court sees that
injustice will be done by granting the order of set-off, it should be
refused.
It will not be questioned, under the authority of the cases cited,
that in the absence of the assignment of the later judgment, Brown,
as the absolute and bona fide holder, by assignment of the earlier
judgment, would be entitled to the set-off sued for; the instant the
second judgment was rendered, this equitable right would have
attached. Nor will the general doctrine be controverted, that
where, at the time of the assignment of a chose in action, an equitable right of set-off exists against the assignor, the assignee takes
the chose in action subject to such right of set-off, even though he
is without knowledge of its existence. No reason appears why the
assignee of a judgment should be held to occupy a position superior
to that of the assignee of any other chose in action, whereby he
may take it free from existing equities, and withdraw it from the
operation of a set-off, which, in the absence of such transfer, would,
without question, be enforced.
No greater hardship would fall upon the assignee for value without notice, in this than in any other case. Holmes must be presumed to have knoin the law-that the right of set-off existed, if
Brown held a judgment against his assignor, either by recovery in
his own name, or by assignment. An examination of the records
of the several courts would have shown whether any judgment was
outstanding against Cyrenius Hendrickson. Holmes can take no
higher title to the judgment than his assignor had at the time of
the assignment, a judgment to which the right of set-off attached
as soon as it was recovered. Admitting that the claims of Holmes
and Brown are equally meritorious, there is no reason why the right
to set-off in favor of Brown, which had attached prior to the assignment to Holmes, should be divested for the benefit of the latter.
The equities being equal, Brown occupies the stronger position.
Being earlier in point of time, he is entitled to the benefit of the
maxim, Qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure. Such is the
rule in courts of equity. In Gay v. Gay, 10 Paige 369, Chancellor
WALWORTH held that the assignee of a chose in action, the assignment of which is available to him in equity only, takes it subject to
all the equities which existed against it in the hands of the assignor,
including the equitable right of set-off, if any such existed, against
the assignor.
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This docfrine is reeognised in the subsequent case of Barber v.
Spencer, 1i Paige 517.
In Chamberlin v. Day, 3 Cowen 353, the New York Supreme
Court ordered the set-off in a case precisely like the one under consideration. There, Wiley purchased a judgment of C. against D.,
without notice that D. had previously purchased a judgment against
C., and the court said:"That Wiley took the assignment subject to all equities actually
existing against 0.'s judgment at the time of the assignment. Want
of notice will not protect against these. D. had purchased, and
taken an assignment of G.'s judgment against C., before the assignment to Wiley, and, having a right to this set-off prior to that assignment, it did not divest that right."
I Chief Justice SAVAGE, in commenting on this case in People v.
New York, 13 Wend. 649, fully approves it, and says that notice to
the second assignee is not at all important, as its only effect is to protect the assignee of the first judgment against the improper act
of his assignor after the assignment.
. Justice CowEN takes the same view in Graves v. Woodbury, 4
Hill 559, declaring that the fact that the party purchased and took
an assignment of the second judgment for a valuable consideration,
even without notice, would form no objection, if the right of set-off
existed at the time, for an assignee takes subject to all equitable as
well as legal defences which can be urged against the assignor.
That the assignee of a judgment occupies no better position than
his assignor, at the time of the assignment, is the well-settled rule
in New York, and is in accordance with the general principles
which govern the transfer of choses in action: Douglass v. White,
3 Barb. Oh. 621; Waring v. Loder, 53 N. Y. 581; 2 Lead. Cas.
in Eq. 1672 (ed. 1877).
. t seems to me that the substantial justice of the case will be promoted by according to Brown the relief he seeks. He obtained
the judgment against Cyrenius Hendrickson by assignment, as an
indemnity for any loss he might sustain by making sale of certain
property uniler an execution in his hands, as sheriff of Monmouth
county, against Henry D. Hendrickson, and for making that sale,
Cyrenius.recovered against Byawa-the-judgment in question
Lord MANSFIELD said: "That natural equity requires that cross
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demands should compensate each other by deducting the less sum
from the greater, and that the difference is the only sum which can
be justly due."
The real right of the case, therefore, would have been reached by
the court saying to Cyrenius .that the judgment which Brown held,
by assignment, against him, should in that suit be applied in reduction of whatever sum he could show he was entitled to recover against
Brown, allowing a verdict to be taken for the party to whom the
balance might be due. Under the statute concerning sei-off, this
course was not open to the court. But after judgment, when the
equitable power of the court asserts itself, strict rules of procedure
are no longer in the way of doing exact justice, and it seems quite
clear that Brown ought not to be compelled to pay a judgment
recovered against him for 6653, by Cyrenius Hendrickson, who is
insolvent, while he holds a prior judgment against Cyrenius for
more than $1700. That the judgment was assigned to Holmes,
without notice to him that Brown held the prior judgment, cannot
affect the equitable right of Brown, because Brown had no means
of giving actual notice to all the world that he held the prior judgment by assignment, while Holmes or any other purchaser of the
judgment, against Brown, could have ascertained, by inquiry from
him, that he intended to claim the set-off.
Between these litigants, I think the loss should fall upon Holmes,
and that Brown should be protected by directing the set-off, except
as to the costs. In England, in setting off judgments, there is a
difference between the King's Bench and Common Pleas as to the
attorney's liens for costs, the former holding that the costs are not
to be set off, but only the balance of the judgment after the costs
are paid; the latter subordinates the attorney's lien to the equities
of the parties. The practice in the King's Bench is the more reasonable one for this court, in view of the fact that the-attorney is
liable for the costs of its officers ; and to the extent of the costs,
equity should regard the judgment as in favor of the attorney himself.
The order for set-off should be entered accordingly.

